2:24-cv-76
06-10-2024
RINNER JABBAR HAULEY, Plaintiff, v. CHIPPEWA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al., Defendants.
MAARTEN VERMAAT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
OPINION
MAARTEN VERMAAT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate order, the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circ*mstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).
But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm'n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties' solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties' in other contexts”).
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff lists as defendants URF and the following URF staff and/or contractors: Dr. Genevieve Maloney, Psychiatrist Aho Toyah, Psychologist/Clinical Social Worker Unknown Costner, and Dietician Jacob Burger.
Plaintiff refers to this Defendant as both “Toyah” and “Tovah.” Because Plaintiff lists this Defendant as “Aho Toyah” in the initial list of parties, the Court will refer to this Defendant as Defendant Toyah throughout this opinion.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Toyah prescribed Plaintiff a medication used to treat mental health issues even though Defendant Toyah was aware that Plaintiff does not have any mental health issues. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff told Defendant Toyah that his “back was still hurting and the medication was not working,” and Defendant Toyah increased Plaintiff's dosage. (Id.)
Plaintiff was “notified” that the medication that Defendant Toyah had prescribed was causing Plaintiff's back, stomach, and chest to hurt and that he needed to stop taking the medication; however, Defendant Maloney told Plaintiff that he could not stop because “j[us]t stopping” could cause “dangerous effects,” including but not limited to nightmares and suicidal thoughts. (Id.) Defendant Maloney also told Plaintiff that the medication was “known for” other health issues that Plaintiff had been experiencing, including stomach pain, weight loss, loss of appetite, “no bowel movement,” “sensitive smelling,” and the inability to keep down solids and liquids. (Id.)
Plaintiff identifies Defendant Costner as a witness only; Plaintiff has “no complaint” against her. (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burger is slowly changing Plaintiff's diet from liquids to solids and has indicated to Plaintiff that he does not know whether the medication is the cause of Plaintiff's symptoms. (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
II. Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Here, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as raising Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical condition.
Although Plaintiff names Defendants in their official capacities only (ECF No. 1, PageID.2), given Plaintiff's allegations of personal involvement (id., PageID.4) and his request for compensatory damages (id., PageID.5) the Court will liberally construe Plaintiff's complaint as also bringing Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants in their respective individual capacities.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446-51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner's severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff's claim, however, is based on “the prison's failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner's affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Lawler as next friend of Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., Tennessee, 93 F.4th 919, 927 (6th Cir. 2024).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant's subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circ*mstantial evidence. . .: A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.'” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the United States Supreme Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.Id. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 Fed.Appx. 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 Fed.Appx. 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Rouster, 749 F.3d at 448; Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 Fed.Appx. 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196 Fed.Appx. 410 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 Fed.Appx. 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock v. Crall, 8 Fed.Appx. 439, 440-41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, . . . he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.'” Mitchell, 553 Fed.Appx. at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). The prisoner must demonstrate that the care the prisoner received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).
A. Defendant Toyah
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Toyah prescribed Plaintiff a medication used to treat mental health issues, despite being aware that Plaintiff does not have any mental health issues. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) When Plaintiff told Defendant Toyah that his “back was still hurting and the medication was not working,” and Defendant Toyah increased Plaintiff's dosage. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the medication has caused him to suffer adverse side effects, including stomach pain, weight loss, loss of appetite, “no bowel movement,” “sensitive smelling,” and the inability to keep down solids and liquids. (Id.)
Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Court will assume without deciding that Plaintiff has satisfied the objective component of the deliberate indifference test. However, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts that would plausibly suggest that Defendant Toyah was subjectively “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and that Defendant Toyah personally drew that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Toyah prescribed Plaintiff a medication which Plaintiff does not believe that he needs or does not believe is best suited to address Plaintiff's complaints of back pain. However, this difference in judgment between Plaintiff and his medical provider is not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. See Darrah, 865 F.3d at 372. Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would plausibly suggest that Defendant Toyah was subjectively aware that providing Plaintiff with the medication, or increasing the medication in response to Plaintiff's comment that it was not working, would result in any serious medical condition.
Plaintiff's allegations are premised on his claim that his prescription must be wrong because the medication is typically used for mental health but his symptom is back pain. That premise is plainly wrong. Antidepressants are commonly used to treat pain generally and back pain specifically. See, e.g., Mayo Clinic Staff, Antidepressants: Another weapon against chronic pain, (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.mayoclinic.org/pain-medications/art-20045647. The Court's analysis relies only on the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, not the cited article.
Moreover, even if the medication prescribed by Defendant Toyah is not appropriate to address Plaintiff's complaint, mere “errors in medical judgment or other negligent behavior” do not support an Eighth Amendment claim. Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08). Where, as here, treatment is provided and the issue is simply the adequacy of that treatment, the court is deferential to the judgments of medical professionals. Id.; see also Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5.
Furthermore, “the prescribing of drugs by a physician[, or other medical provider,] which causes side effects does not constitute deliberate indifference.” Mason v. Eddy, No. 1:18-cv-2968, 2019 WL 3766804, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2019) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Walker v. Abdellatif, No. 1:07-cv-1267, 2009 WL 579394, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2009) (discussing that “medication adjustments involve the doctor's medical judgment regarding plaintiff's treatment,” and a plaintiff s “disagreement with the health care providers regarding his diagnosis and treatment does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation” (citations omitted)); Christensen v. United States, No. 5:11-321-KKC, 2013 WL 4521040, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2013) (discussing that the doctor's “decision to continue [the inmate's] prescription for [the medication that caused side effects] was evidently based upon her medical judgment that its benefits to his long-term cardiac health outweighed its detrimental side effects”). At most, Plaintiff's factual allegations suggest that Defendant Toyah acted negligently by prescribing the medication, but an Eighth Amendment violation requires a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Additionally, besides alleging that Defendant Toyah was the medical provider who initially prescribed the medication, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Toyah was aware of the subsequent sides effects that Plaintiff had from the medication. Under these circ*mstances, there are no facts in the complaint from which to reasonably infer that Defendant Toyah was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
For each of these reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Toyah.
B. Defendant Maloney
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Maloney fares no better. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Maloney was aware that Plaintiff was experiencing negative side effects from the medication that had been prescribed by Defendant Toyah, but nonetheless continued Plaintiff's medication, citing risks of nightmares and suicidal thoughts should Plaintiff stop the medication suddenly. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
As discussed in detail above, continuing Plaintiff's medication despite adverse side effects does not state a claim for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff's complaint describes that Defendant Maloney made a medical judgment not to stop Plaintiff's medication abruptly to avoid what Defendant Maloney described as “dangerous” consequences. Even if this judgment was ultimately in error, that error does not support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08).
C. Defendants Costner and Burger
Plaintiff names Defendants Costner and Burger in his complaint but makes no allegations of wrongdoing against either Defendant. Plaintiff acknowledges that he has no complaint against Defendant Costner and describes only that Defendant Burger is attempting to switch Plaintiff's diet from liquids to solids and is “j[us]t trying anything.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without a specific allegation of wrongdoing, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff's claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would plausibly suggest that Defendants Costner and Burger were involved in any violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them.
D. Defendant Chippewa Correctional Facility
Finally, Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Chippewa Correctional Facility. However, the Correctional Facility is one of several facilities operated by the MDOC. It is a building; it is not amenable to suit as a separate entity. See Watson v. Gill, 40 Fed.Appx. 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff's complaint against the Chippewa Correctional Facility fails to state a claim.
Even if Plaintiff meant to sue the MDOC, the claim would be properly dismissed. Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 Fed.Appx. 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 611. Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.